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I.
30 years ago, the Round Tables of 1989 negotiated the end of several state socialist
regimes. They represented highly innovative forms of both regime transition and
constitution making. Following the more complex and less planned Spanish reforma-
pactada-ruptura, the Round Table in Poland was to become a model for the rest
of Central Europe. Most importantly, a specific scenario was generated for the
overcoming of the reform or revolution dilemma that has plagued all radical politics
since the early 20th century. Adding the new element of the round table of the
opposition (EKA) that established unity and bargaining strategy for the national
version (NKA), the Hungarian process fully overcame the liability so often stressed
by transition scholarship, one still confirmed in Poland. Now it became clear that
negotiated transitions do not have to involve undemocratic concessions to the earlier
governmental power.
II.
Yet, the developed form of the round table model was not achieved in either Poland
or Hungary, nor especially where the national question partially defeated the model:
Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic. As it were teleologically, the
developed form of a full round table led democratic regime change was achieved
only in South Africa, in the early and mid 1990s (Codesa in 1991, MPNF of 1993,
Constitutional Assembly of 1994-1996). It involved: 1. A two-stage process with free
elections in between them; 2. The making of two (interim and final) substantively
liberal democratic constitutions; 3. The generation of fully democratic rules of
constitution making in the interim constitution, 4. along with principled restrictions on
the democratic constituent power 5. The latter were enforced by a new constitutional
court. 6. Finally, there was a high level of extensively organized public education,
discussion and involvement during the second stage of the process, under the
interim constitution, producing strong democratic legitimacy for the outcome.
III.
There are empirical as well as normative reasons for considering the South African
version of round table led negotiated regime change superior to all others. The
empirical reason has to do with its over 20 year period of survival, even in the
face of authoritarian-populist challenges under the Jacob Zuma presidency1)It is
symbolically important, that after Zuma, Cyril Ramaphosa, one of the architects
of the South African process has become the president of the republic., linked to
intense grievances that are partly shared with other countries across the globe
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(inequality, weak welfare state protections, incomplete form of retroactive justice
etc.). The not unrelated normative reason lies in the achievement of a complex
from of legitimacy consisting of liberal, party-political, and participatory democratic
dimensions. The high commitment of the undisputed leader, Nelson Mandela, to all
these values was important, but countless militants shared and promoted the same
combination. Thus today in South Africa it is much more difficult to represent the new
constitution as a product of mere elite agreement, or as old regime imposition.
IV.
The developed model of the two stage process can and should be used to help
diagnose what went wrong elsewhere. Here I focus only on Poland and Hungary.
In the former, the undemocratic concession of presidential government should have
been more completely removed in the eventual interim constitution (The Small
Constitution, 1992). Paradoxically it was not under General Jaruzelski but Lech
Wa##sa’s presidency, that presidentialism revealed its potentially authoritarian
features opening the terrain to a populism that was to consume Walesa’s own
reputation in the end. (Ost The Defeat of Solidarity) A final constitution was made
in 1997, but in the face of ongoing populist protest and self-exclusion. Even more
dramatically, in Hungary where there were no rules for final constitution making in
the interim version of 1989, the second stage of the process failed in 1996 in the
face of a peculiar Left Right alliance foreshadowing the populist turn to come. Thus,
in both countries the liberal democratic constitution of 1989-1990 could be (in my
view: falsely) portrayed as a product of nothing but agreement between old and new
elites.
V.
The emergence and success of national populism in Poland and Hungary cannot
be reduced to the failure of constitution making, nor especially to the negotiated
character of the first stage. (as in Mudde-Kaltwasser Populism p.37) The latter claim
is that of populist leaders themselves, who like Orbán and Kaczy#ski were originally
enthusiastic supporters of the round table process’ first stage. But national populism
is now (very unfortunately) a world-wide phenomenon that has its causes in very
broadly shared democratic, welfare and status deficits. (Arato How We Got Here).
The most that can be said is where the two stage round table process produced
sufficient democratic legitimacy, the constitution was and remains better protected
against populist attempts at refoundation, such as the one in Hungary as against the
South African case. Even Poland the material constitution has been only partially
altered in the face of judicial (and European) resistance, and where the documentary
constitution of the regime change and a more democratic electoral rule survive with
potentially important options for democratic oppositions.
VI.
Turning to Hungary, it would be a serious mistake to consider the making of the
new Basic Law by FIDESZ the missing second stage of the round table process,
that the party itself after initial hesitation on this score now prefers to simply
denounce. Its ability to impose a new constitution was due to the combination of
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grave disproportionality in the electoral rule (53% of votes made into 67% of the
seats) and the simple one chamber 2/3 amendment rule both inherited from the
transitional arrangement. FIDESZ chose not to imitate the highly consensual but
failed effort of 1994-1996, which it strongly supported back then. Instead, it carried
out a constitutional revolution (“revolution of the voting booths”) in the manner of
those populists elsewhere who are able to do so, marginalizing opposition and
weakening liberal checks and balances during the process and especially in its
result. A new “illiberal democracy” has been announced (called NER: system of
national co-operation).
VII.
It is controversial whether or not there has been yet another regime change under
FIDESZ in Hungary. In general, I conceive of populism in three main forms: as a
movement, as a government, and as a regime. FIDESZ was a liberal democratic, but
not a populist movement in 1988-1989. After a governmental term and electoral loss
in 2002, it did however organize a new populist movement (Civic Circles) that was
according to a well-known pattern demobilized after 2010 when FIDESZ became the
government. A new constitution such as the Basic Law certainly indicates interest in
constructing a new regime. Yet that very constitution is a hybrid of national-populist
and liberal democratic elements. Does Hungary have a new autocratic regime (as
János Kornai, and János Kis now maintain) or is it a hybrid as the organs of the
European Union implicitly insist on treating it?
VIII.
To me the ambivalence is itself a mark of hybridity. But the answer cannot be
decided purely theoretically. Following a 1971 essay of Leszek Ko#akowski “On
Hope and Hopelessness” that dealt with the question of authoritarianism vs.
totalitarianism I propose that we treat the question of regime type experimentally.
There are grounds for the hypothesis that in Hungary (and even more in Poland) we
are facing populist governments that have had to put up with democratic features
like relatively competitive elections, as well as liberal elements as the precariously
surviving forms of free communication and private security. We can name this
hybridity if we wish “competitive authoritarianism” (Levitsky et.al.). The most
important point is that as the recent results in Hungarian (and Turkish!) urban areas
have shown, it is still possible for the populist governmental party to lose elections,
of course depending on the actions of the fragmented opposition parties (Arato on
Verfassungsblog and Szuverén).
IX.
Is such an outcome possible on the national level, given the reconstructed, now
even more disproportional and gerrymandered electoral rule? Given the changed
electoral rule, the control over electronic media and new forms of clientelism there
are grounds for skepticism. Nevertheless, it is up to the opposition parties to try to
find out not in theory but performatively whether electoral defeat of FIDESZ is or is
not possible. It is clear that only a bloc for democracy has a chance to carry out the
experiment. If they succeed, the example of the negotiated process again becomes
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relevant. Following a friendly suggestion of Kriszta Kovács, I would stress the need
to replace the (at best) hybrid Basic Law with its many illiberal and undemocratic
elements, along with the FIDESZ electoral rule, by a process that has learned from
the round table model. In her cogent view even in the case of the highly unlikely
electoral victory of a united opposition, constitutional change after elections would
again require a negotiated process between the Orbán regime’s remainders and
its opposition. And I would add even if a united coalition did attain a constitutional
amending majority of 2/3, the FIDESZ example of constitutional imposition should
be rejected in favor of a negotiated consensual alternative that was foreshadowed
briefly by the rules of 1994-1996 before the collapse of the effort of completing
the two stage process. This time however, following the South African model’s
second stage, extensive public participation, discussion and education too should be
organized (a suggestion of mine from 1994 that was rejected by the then coalition
parties and their experts).
X.
What if it becomes entirely clear that elections have become fully uncompetitive
and ritualized and an autocratic regime form has been consolidated? We have
been there before. Put optimistically, it cannot be more difficult to replace the
new autocracy than it was to force communist governments to accept regime
change. Such a process however is not possible without either external pressure or
mobilization from below. What should be the modality of transformation? Here the
lessons of 1989 transcending the reform-revolution dichotomy would again become
extremely relevant. Surely top down reform by the present incumbents, even under
European pressure,  would try to preserve as many authoritarian elements as
feasible, and thus at best re-introduce hybridity such as existed in Mexico for a 30
year period, and in Chile for one almost as long. Hopefully, the authoritarian logic of
external imposition and revolution both are not yet forgotten in a country where they
had disastrous consequences. Thus we would do well to try to apply once again the
round table led negotiated model, in this case (as against the scenario of IX) starting
with its very first stage. If the current rules do not allow democratization, then indeed
new rules are needed. If the new rules are not to be imposed by either incumbents or
revolutionaries, they must once again be negotiated. First and foremost, a genuinely
proportional electoral rule would be required, followed by the reform of structures
of the media and of electoral supervision. Is this at all impossible? To my generally
skeptical Hungarian friends I would say the following: It was done before under much
more difficult and dangerous circumstances! But if accomplished once again, the full
logic of the two stage process should now be followed by carrying out the work of a
post sovereign constituent power.
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